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A U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL CUT-OFF TREATY 
                    Mitsuru Kurosawa*
I. Recent Phenomena on Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
  In August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva decided to establish 
an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons. A so-called cut-off treaty would stop a quantitative 
nuclear arms race, while the CTBT was intended to stop a qualitative one. 
  The scope of such a treaty, that is, what activities shall be prohibited, is not 
clear. It will prohibit only future production, or provide some measures of control 
or transparency on stockpiles. The modalities of verification is not clear yet, 
however, the IAEA is sure to be an active player to verify the obligations of a cut-
off treaty. It may be a traditional measure of safeguards, or beyond it. The 
negotiation will take a long time because so many things are left open. 
  In May 1988, India and Pakistan conducted a series of underground nuclear 
tests, which defied an international nuclear non-proliferation regime. As neither 
country is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), only a part of 
their nuclear activities are under IAEA safeguards. They have enough nuclear 
materials which are not safeguarded to conduct nuclear tests, without violating, in a 
strict legal sense, any rule of international law. However, they were severely 
criticized and condemned because the tests were thought to be violating a 
fundamental norm in international society. 
  The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are a great challenge to the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, an important component of which is 
safeguards. Efforts to apply full-scope safeguards to India and Pakistan have not 
succeeded. International society has failed to involve India and Pakistan in the non-
proliferation regime technically as well as politically. 
  The tests also made it clear that the nuclear non-proliferation regime contained a
characteristic which could be seen as discriminatory unless nuclear disarmament 
measures were taken in parallel by declared nuclear-weapon states.
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II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards
  Safeguards are indispensable for nuclear non-proliferation. Full-scope 
safeguards are applied to every non-nuclear-weapon state which is a party to the 
NPT according to an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement with the IAEA, 
which was recently strengthened. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreements 
have been concluded between the IAEA and de facto nuclear-weapon states, that is, 
India, Israel and Pakistan. They are not full-scope, but cover only a part of their 
nuclear activities. As was shown in the recent nuclear tests, this type of safeguards 
is not wide and tight enough to prevent states concerned from conducting nuclear 
tests. The third category of safeguards is applied to a few of nuclear facilities in the 
declared nuclear-weapon states according to agreements concluded with the IAEA 
on the basis of voluntary offers. It has no logical base from the viewpoint of non-
proliferation, but was introduced to mitigate a sense of discrimination felt by non-
nuclear-weapon states in commercial and political fields.
III. Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
  Nuclear non-proliferation is very important for international peace and security 
in preventing a state from going nuclear. The NPT and the treaties establishing 
nuclear-weapon-free zones are key elements of the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime. More than 180 non-nuclear-weapon states are parties to the 
former, and around 100 non-nuclear-weapon states are parties to the latter. 
Although some non-nuclear-weapon states think nuclear weapons are necessary for 
national security, many non-nuclear-weapon states support the regime even though 
they are prohibited from developing and obtaining nuclear weapons. There are two 
reasons for their support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Some states do 
not need nuclear weapons from national security point of view, either because they 
are under nuclear umbrella or because they have established a nuclear-weapon-free 
zone. The second and more important reason is that they think that the smaller the 
number of nuclear-weapon states is, the better it is for international security and the 
easier for proceeding to nuclear disarmament. 
  Nuclear disarmament, that is, effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament according to the 
phrase in Article VI of the NPT, should be taken in parallel with measures of 
nuclear non-proliferation, in order to reduce discriminatory elements contained in 
the NPT and to eventually lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world.
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  According to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons on July 8, 1996, "There exists an 
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to 
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international 
control." 
  In the process of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), which had originally been thought to be a nuclear disarmament 
measure because it would stop a qualitative nuclear arms race, some criticized that 
it was transformed into a nuclear non-proliferation measure. It is because the 
nuclear-weapon states strongly pushed for the inclusion of India, Israel and 
Pakistan into the treaty by making their ratification as the condition of its entry into 
force, and because the treaty has a loophole which allows technically advanced 
nations to conduct sub-critical tests and computer simulations which would make it 
possible for them to develop new and sophisticated nuclear weapons. 
  A cut-off treaty, which is originally thought to be a measure to stop a 
quantitative nuclear arms race, may become a non-proliferation measure, if its main 
focus is adjusted on basis of the three de facto nuclear-weapon states, as the five 
declared nuclear-weapon states have already stopped producing nuclear fissile 
material for weapon purposes. Not only a nuclear non-proliferation perspective but 
also a nuclear disarmament perspective should be taken into account during coming 
negotiations. 
IV. A U.S.-Russia Bilateral Treaty 
  It is very good news that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva agreed to 
establish an ad hoc committee for negotiating a cut-off treaty. However, it seems to 
me that negotiation will take a long time, and even the agreement on the scope of 
prohibition will be difficult to attain soon. In parallel with the multilateral 
negotiations at the CD, the United States and Russia should begin bilateral 
negotiations on transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear 
disarmament, including prohibition of future production of nuclear fissile material. 
  As a precedent, President Bush and President Gorbachev concluded an 
Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on 
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons 
in June 1990. This bilateral agreement was an important and necessary step 
towards a multilateral, comprehensive and global Chemical Weapon Convention 
(CWC), and increased political pressure on those still reluctant to support a global
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convention. It also constituted a basis upon which meaningful multilateral 
negotiations could be built. The agreement played an important role as a precursor 
for the multilateral CWC. 
  There exist preconditions for bilateral negotiations. First, on September 23, 
1997, Vice President AI Gore and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin agreed on 
cooperation regarding plutonium production reactors. Under the agreement, they 
will not restart any of their plutonium production reactors that have already been 
shut down, and Russia will convert by December 31, 2000, with U.S. assistance, its 
three operating reactors so that they cease all production of non-reactor-grade 
plutonium. In the U.S. all 14 such reactors were shut down by 1989, and in Russia, 
as mentioned above, 3 are still operating of a total 13 reactors. 
  In addition, verification on shutdown reactors and converted reactors will be 
introduced. For shutdown reactors, U.S. and Russia monitors will install and 
periodically check seals or other monitoring equipment to provide assurance that 
the reactors could not be restarted without detection. For converted reactors, U.S. 
monitors will measure random samples of fresh fuel to determine that the fuel is the 
intended type, and they will install monitoring devices in the fuel discharge areas to 
ensure that fuel is discharged only when scheduled. 
  With these agreements, they could transform their non-production moratorium 
into legally binding obligations which include bilateral verification measures. If 
highly enriched uranium production plants, currently active as well as closed, were 
included in the verification system, it would be tantamount to a cut-off treaty. 
  Second, since President Clinton's September 1993 policy statement, the U.S. 
has placed about 12 metric tons of excess plutonium and HEU under IAEA 
safeguards. At the 1996 IAEA General Conference, Secretary Hazel O'Leary 
offered to make an additional 26 metric tons of HEU available for Agency 
inspection within three years, and at the 1997 IAEA General Conference, Secretary 
Federico Pena offered a further 52 tons of excess materials for IAEA inspection. A 
total of 90 metric tons of fissile material has been committed to be under IAEA 
inspection. 
  Third, in December 1997, the IAEA began the independent verification of 
excess highly enriched uranium downblending operations at the Portsmouth 
gaseous diffusion plant in Ohio. This is a part of the policy of the Clinton 
Administration, which has declared 226 metric tons of weapon-usable fissile 
materials excess to U.S. defense needs and would submit this material to inspection 
by the IAEA. The IAEA carries out verification activities at Portsmouth that 
provide international confidence that the approximately 3.5 metric tons of highly
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enriched uranium being downblended has indeed been removed irreversibly from 
U.S. defense uses. 
  Fourth, under the Trilateral Initiative, launched on September 17, 1996, by 
Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Viktor Mikhailov, Secretary 
of Energy of the U.S. Hazal O'Leary and Director General of the IAEA, Hans Blix, 
the U.S., Russia and the IAEA are considering practical measures for the 
application of IAEA verification to weapon-origin fissile material. The aim was to 
fulfill the commitment made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin concerning IAEA 
verification of weapon-origin fissile materials and to complement their 
commitments regarding the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms 
reduction. 
  Fifth, on July 24, 1998, the U.S. and Russia concluded an agreement on 
scientific and technical cooperation in the management of plutonium that has been 
withdrawn from nuclear military programs. Management of plutonium means the 
transformation of plutonium, which has been withdrawn from nuclear military 
programs and is no longer required for defense purposes, into spent fuel or other 
forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons. In September 1998, at Moscow 
summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed that United States and Russia 
will each remove approximate 50 metric tons of plutonium from their respective 
nuclear weapon program and convert it into a form that will assure it can never 
again be used in such weapons. 
  Sixth, in May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol 
for the Part 2 of Program 93+2, or the Strengthened Safeguards System, which 
mainly focuses on completeness of IAEA safeguards to find out undeclared 
facilities and activities by adopting expanded declaration and access. Although this 
Protocol is additional to the comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded 
between the IAEA and non-nuclear-weapon states, universality of its application, 
that is, its applicability to nuclear-weapon states was one of the most controversial 
issues during its negotiation. All five nuclear powers have announced their 
intention to apply some of new safeguards to their commercial nuclear facilities. In 
particular, the White House, on May 16, 1997, announced that it would accept the 
new measures in their entirety except where they involve information and locations 
of direct national security significance. 
  On June 11, 1998, the IAEA Board of Governors approved additional protocols 
for the United States, France and the United Kingdom. They are going to provide 
much more information on nuclear activities. 
  Based on these recent progress,it would be possible to negotiate and conclude a
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bilateral U.S.-Russia treaty which not only prohibits future production of fissile 
material but also ensures transparency and irreversibility of nuclear reduction. It 
would be of a great utility as an example for other nuclear-weapon states and de 
facto nuclear-weapon states. A treaty should include following measures regarding 
safeguards and verification. 
  Parties should undertake not to produce nuclear fissile material for weapon 
purposes, which has been implemented so far voluntarily and unilaterally. In order 
to verify this obligation, all HEU and plutonium production plants for both peaceful 
and military purposes, either currently active or closed, should be under safeguards 
or verification conducted by the IAEA. Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities 
should be conducted as short-notice random inspections taking into account of the 
principle of cost-effectiveness. 
  The parties should put their excess nuclear materials from dismantled nuclear 
weapons under the IAEA safeguards and verification. They should agree on a 
schedule for transformation from military to peaceful uses of fissile material in a 
legally binding form, otherwise, the transformation would take a long time and 
security of the fissile material would be jeopardized. Some of the U.S. fissile 
material is under IAEA inspection and some more, up to 90 metric tons, is 
scheduled to come under the inspection. Russia has declared at the IAEA General 
Conference on September 26, 1997 that 500 tons of HEU and 50 tons of plutonium 
would be excess in the process of nuclear disarmament. So far, no Russian fissile 
material is under IAEA inspection. There must be an agreed schedule for the 
dismantlement and transformation of nuclear weapons into peaceful uses. 
  Parties should inform the international society how much fissile materials is in 
the process of transformation, that is, how much is still in weapons form though 
they have been removed from weapons ystem, or how much is in pits designated to 
be dismantled. Hopefully, they should register the number of their nuclear weapons 
currently deployed and reserved to show how nuclear reduction is proceeding and 
ensure its irreversibility. The IAEA safeguards and verification should be applied 
at as early a stage of the process as possible. For example, the IAEA could monitor 
the storage of pits at its portal to make it sure that they do not go back to weapons 
but only go to a dismantlement plant. 
  On these measures, though the U.S. and Russia would prefer a bilateral 
verification system, the IAEA should take initiative for international safeguards and 
verification, because these measures hould afford an example to other nuclear-
weapon states and de facto nuclear-weapon states.
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V. Conclusion 
  The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decided to extend the NPT 
indefinitely in political linkage with the adoption of two important documents. The 
one is the decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty, and the 
other is the decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament. In the latter documents, a series of important issues were listed in 
connection with the indefinite extension of the NPT. On nuclear disarmament, it 
stipulates as follows; 
  The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization 
and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as 
reflected below; 
  (a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a 
      universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive
      Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996. 
  (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a 
      non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the
      production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
      explosive device, in accordance with the statement of the Special 
      Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained 
      therein; 
  (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and 
      progressive fforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate 
      goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all states of general and 
      complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 
  The first measure, that is, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 1996 and opened 
for signature. The first measure was accomplished successfully and the Treaty was 
signed by more than 150 states o far, although the entry into force of the Treaty 
will be difficult because all 44 states including 5 nuclear weapons, India, Pakistan, 
Israel and North Korea which are listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, have to ratify. 
  The second measure, that is, a universal cut-off treaty, is supposed to begin 
negotiation from January 1999 under the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. 
Under the 1995 decision, the immediate commencement and early conclusion of 
negotiations of a treaty was recommended. One reason of its delay is that the
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Conference on Disarmament concentrated its efforts on the conclusion of the 
CTBT. Another reason is that India has been linking the negotiation on a cut-off 
treaty with a negotiation on a nuclear weapon elimination convention with strict 
time-bound framework, and Pakistan has been emphasizing to deal with not only a 
future production but also a stockpile of nuclear material within a cut-off treaty. 
  Two years after the adoption of the CTBT, a negotiation on a cut-off treaty was 
agreed because India and Pakistan changed their respective position after they 
conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. They yielded their position partly because 
they wanted to mitigate international criticism on their testing. 
  A U.S.-Russia bilateral treaty which not only prohibits future production of 
nuclear material for weapon purposes but also deals with nuclear material which 
comes out of dismantled nuclear weapons, would be very useful as it would provide 
an example for other states on the one hand, and as it would include not only 
prohibition of future production but also transparency and irreversibility of U.S.-
Russia nuclear disarmament on the other hand.
